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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter comes on before this Court on four
consolidated appeals and cross-appeals from an order of the
District Court dated March 29, 2007, and entered on March 30,
2007, denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment and
granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs’ cross-motion for
summary judgment. See Shaver v. Siemens Corp., No.
2:02cv1424, 2007 WL 1006681 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2007).
Plaintiffs, now the appellees/cross-appellants in this appeal, 1
Ronald Shaver, William Whitney, Joe Fedele, Ralph Riberich,
and Anthony Katz, on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated, brought this class action against defendants, now
appellants/cross-appellees, Siemens Corporation (“Siemens”),
appellees’ former employer, and its retirement plans, Siemens
Westinghouse Retirement Plan for Union Employees and
Siemens Westinghouse Retirement Plan, alleging that those
1

As a matter of convenience, we refer to plaintiffs simply as
“appellees.”
6

entities violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (“ERISA”) by refusing to provide appellees with
Permanent Job Separation pension benefits (“PJS benefits”)
when Siemens terminated their employment. Appellees’ action
has been partially successful in the District Court but remains
unresolved as to the rest of the case. For the reasons that follow,
we will reverse on one of Siemens’ appeals to the extent that the
District Court denied it summary judgment for we conclude that
Siemens was entitled to summary judgment on the entire case
with respect to all appellees, and we will remand the case to the
District Court for entry of judgment in favor of Siemens and its
retirement plans. Entry of the order on the remand will bring
this litigation to a close with respect to the substantive matters at
issue. 2

II. FACTUAL and PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 14, 1997, Westinghouse Electric
Corporation (“Westinghouse”) 3 agreed to sell its Power
Generation Business Unit (“PGBU”) to Siemens in a transaction
to be effectuated through an Asset Purchase Agreement
(“APA”). There was, however, a delay in the consummation of
the transaction, and Siemens and Westinghouse did not execute
2

It is possible that the District Court will need to enter orders on
some housekeeping matters such as the imposition of costs.

3

Subsequently, Westinghouse changed its name to CBS, Inc.,
and it is now known as Viacom, Inc.
7

the APA until approximately nine months later, on August 19,
1998.
As the APA contemplated, Siemens hired all
Westinghouse PGBU employees who, on August 19, 1998, had
been working actively, were on vacation, or were on short-term
disability (“legacy employees”). Appellees are 227 legacy
employees who transferred employment from Westinghouse to
Siemens.
At the time that Siemens and Westinghouse executed the
APA, Westinghouse sponsored and maintained a defined benefit
pension plan for its employees, including the soon-to-be legacy
employees (the “Westinghouse Plan”). Under section 19 of the
Westinghouse Plan, employees who satisfied certain age and
service requirements, but did not qualify for normal retirement
benefits, and who were terminated by an “Employer, an
Affiliated Entity, or Excluded Unit because of job movement or
product line relocation or location closedown” were entitled to
PJS benefits. J.A. 292, 345. Stated succinctly, PJS benefits
provide for payment of an employee’s normal retirement benefit
without actuarial reduction prior to normal retirement age, an
additional monthly payment of $10.00 multiplied by the
employee’s years of credited service if the employee’s special
retirement date 4 was on or before January 1, 1995, and an
additional monthly payment of $100.00 if the employee had 25
years of eligibility service and his special retirement date was on
4

A plan participant’s special retirement date under section 19 of
the Westinghouse Plan is the first day of the month following
the month in which Westinghouse terminates the participant’s
employment due to job movement, product line relocation, or
location closedown.
8

or before January 1, 1995. See id. 345-50. As we later will
explain, it is highly significant that the Westinghouse Plan
defined an “Employer, Affiliated Entity, or Excluded Unit” as
Westinghouse or any Westinghouse subsidiary or joint venture
participating in the Westinghouse Plan. Id. 284, 288, 292. The
definition did not, however, include any future employer, here
Siemens, of Westinghouse employees.
The Westinghouse Plan also contained two critical
express limitations on the availability of PJS benefits: (1) a
provision providing that “in no event shall a Permanent Job
Separation occur if an Employee is offered continued
employment by . . . a successor employer,” and (2) a so-called
“sunset provision” providing that “[i]n no event shall a
Permanent Job Separation occur after August 31, 1998.” Id.
293. Thus, in the absence of an amendment of the
Westinghouse Plan, the plan would not provide for PJS benefits
to an employee offered employment by a successor to
Westinghouse, as happened here, or by reason of a separation
after August 31, 1998, as was also the case here.
The APA included many specific provisions governing
the pensions and benefits of the legacy employees, which, so far
as germane to this appeal, we explain in more detail below. At
its broadest, however, the APA required that Siemens establish a
defined benefit pension plan for the legacy employees “that
contain[ed] terms and conditions that are substantially identical
with respect to all substantive provisions to those of the
Westinghouse Pension Plan as in effect as of the Closing Date”
of the APA and that Siemens was to provide “compensation and
benefit plans and arrangements which in the aggregate are
9

comparable” to those of the Westinghouse Plan as of the closing
date.
Id. 137-38.
Thus, Westinghouse and Siemens
contemplated that the pension benefits for legacy employees
essentially would continue unabated after consummation of the
sale of the PGBU. There is, however, no suggestion in the APA
or in any other document elsewhere in the record that
Westinghouse and Siemens contemplated that the consummation
of the sale would result in enhancement of the legacy
employees’ pension benefits.
Although Westinghouse and Siemens did not execute the
APA until August 19, 1998, prior to that date they adopted an
amendment to the APA that provided that the closing date of the
APA, though only for the purpose of pensions and benefits,
would be September 1, 1998. 5 In the same amendment
5

The District Court found and the parties agree that Siemens
and Westinghouse amended the APA to alter the closing date for
pension and benefit purposes to September 1, 1998. In reality,
however, the amendment was more specific than that and
provided that “[a]ll references to ‘Closing Date’ in [s]ections
5.5(d), (e) and (h) shall be changed to September 1, 1998.” J.A.
154. In fact, however, there are provisions of the APA that deal
with pensions and benefits that are not within the sections
enumerated above. In particular, sections 5.5(a) and 2.3(a)
implicate pensions and benefits. In light of the parties’ longstanding agreement as to the import of the amendment, however,
and for ease of reference, we insert September 1, 1998, as the
closing date for all APA provisions dealing with pensions and
benefits. We note, however, that the precise closing date of the
APA is potentially relevant only as to our discussion in section
10

Westinghouse and Siemens also amended the APA to provide
that Westinghouse would amend its pension plan to offer the
legacy employees, though only for benefit accrual purposes,
credit for service and compensation from August 19 through
August 31, 1998, even though Siemens would become their
employer as of August 19. In turn, Siemens agreed not to
terminate any legacy employee other than for cause prior to
September 1, 1998, and agreed that if it nevertheless did so it
would “reimburse [Westinghouse] for any actuarial pension loss
caused by any such termination.” Id. 156. Thereafter,
Westinghouse amended its plan to reflect this amendment to the
APA.
On October 29, 1998, Siemens adopted separate but
virtually identical defined benefit pension plans for union and
non-union employees, which were made effective retroactively
to September 1, 1998, the plans thereby becoming activated as
of the time the Westinghouse Plan no longer would give the
legacy employees credit for service and compensation.
Consequently, the consummation of the Westinghouse-Siemens
transaction left the legacy employees in the same position in
which they had been prior to the closing of the transaction with
regard to PJS benefits because under the Westinghouse Plan
V(B)(3)(b) of this opinion concerning whether the APA
contractually required Siemens to offer PJS benefits. We thus
only address the disparate closing dates in that section of our
decision and note that inserting August 19, 1998, as the closing
date of the APA into sections 5.5(a) and 2.3(a) does not alter the
outcome of this case.
11

separation from service after August 31, 1998, could not result
in a terminated employee being eligible for PJS benefits.
As we have indicated, notwithstanding the sale of the
PGBU to Siemens and the adoption of the Siemens Plans, after
execution of the APA and to this day, the Westinghouse Plan
has remained in existence and it continues to provide legacy
employees the pension benefits they accrued under the
Westinghouse Plan. Legacy employees who qualify for benefits
thus receive two pension payments: one from the Westinghouse
Plan for benefits accrued prior to September 1, 1998, and
another from a Siemens Plan for benefits accrued from
September 1, 1998 forward. 6
In 1999, Siemens closed certain PGBU facilities and
consequently terminated the employment of numerous legacy
employees, including the appellees in this case. Upon their
termination, 207 of the 227 appellees signed severance
agreements in which they released Siemens from liability and
promised not to sue it for any claims related to or arising out of
their employment or termination. In exchange for their signing
the agreement, Siemens paid the signatories varying amounts of
severance pay. Though the validity of the releases was a major
issue in the District Court, as will be seen we need not address
that issue on this appeal. Notwithstanding having executed
these releases, in March 2002 appellees submitted claims to the
6

As explained below, however, there are certain benefits which
are considered to have “accrued” for purposes of ERISA section
204(g) prior to September 1, 1998, for which Westinghouse is
no longer liable.
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Siemens Plans for PJS benefits, but the Siemens Plans’
administrative committees denied those claims on the ground
that neither Plan provided for PJS benefits, an undoubtedly
correct decision so far as the terms of the Siemens Plans were
concerned.
On August 15, 2002, appellees filed a complaint in the
District Court against Siemens and the Siemens Plans, alleging
that those entities’ denial of their claims for PJS benefits
violated ERISA. The Court assigned the case to a Magistrate
Judge for pretrial proceedings in accordance with the Magistrate
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Following discovery, the parties
filed cross-motions for summary judgment, which led to the
Magistrate Judge’s filing a report and recommendation on
December 13, 2005, with the District Court. After the parties
filed objections and responses, the Court entered the order
which is the subject of this appeal.
The Magistrate Judge recommended that the District
Court grant appellees’ motion as to the 20 class members who
had not signed releases (the “Non-Release Plaintiffs”) and grant
Siemens’ motion as to the 207 members who had signed releases
(the “Release Plaintiffs”). The Magistrate Judge concluded that
Siemens violated ERISA sections 208, 29 U.S.C. § 1058, and
204(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g), a decision she based on two
theories which we address in detail below. The Magistrate
Judge determined, however, that Siemens had satisfied its initial
burden with respect to the Release Plaintiffs of proving the
waivers’ validity and further determined that appellees had
failed to provide evidence that they did not knowingly and
voluntarily execute the waivers. Consequently, the Magistrate
13

Judge recommended that the Court grant summary judgment in
Siemens’ favor with respect to the Release Plaintiffs. Thus, the
gravamen of the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation was that
Siemens wrongfully denied all appellees PJS benefits but to the
extent that appellees had waived their PJS claims by executing
the severance agreements including releases of their PJS claims
Siemens avoided liability.
The parties filed cross-objections and responses in the
District Court to the report and recommendation as both sides
were satisfied in part and dissatisfied in part with the report and
recommendation. On March 29, 2007, the Court granted
appellees’ summary judgment motion with respect to the NonRelease Plaintiffs and denied summary judgment to Siemens as
to both classes of plaintiffs. Apparently adopting both of the
Magistrate Judge’s theories of liability, the Court determined
that Siemens violated ERISA in denying PJS benefits and that in
the absence of their signing releases all appellees would be
entitled to PJS benefits. The Court denied summary judgment to
appellees as to the Release Plaintiffs, as it concluded that a
determination of whether they knowingly and voluntarily
waived their right to bring their claims for PJS benefits required
a fact-intensive inquiry inappropriate for resolution on summary
judgment proceedings as there were material disputes of fact on
the waiver issue.
The District Court entered a final judgment pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) on October 15, 2010,
awarding the Non-Release Plaintiffs approximately $2 million in
damages but denying a claim they asserted for certain retiree
health and life insurance benefits that they contended should
14

accompany PJS benefits. 7 On October 15 the Court certified the
portion of its March 29, 2007 opinion and order denying
appellees’ motion for summary judgment as to the Release
Plaintiffs for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b). The Court also certified for interlocutory appeal
Siemens’ appeal from the Court’s denial of its motion for
summary judgment with respect to the Release Plaintiffs. The
Court characterized the issue for the proposed interlocutory
appeals as whether the Release Plaintiffs’ claim to PJS benefits
could be waived as a matter of law and, if so, what proof must
be presented to demonstrate that there had been a valid waiver.
Both appellees and Siemens petitioned in this Court for
permission to appeal, and on December 13, 2010, we granted
both petitions. These appeals followed. 8

III. JURISDICTION and STANDARD of REVIEW
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) and (f). We have jurisdiction
7

Inasmuch as we determine that appellees are not entitled to the
PJS benefits we do not address their claim that they are entitled
to attendant health and life insurance benefits.
8

The parties filed four separate appeals but we have no need to
explain their procedural history in more detail as we have
consolidated them and our opinion in this consolidated case will
bring these appeals and this litigation in its entirety to a
substantive close.
15

over the parties’ cross-appeals of the District Court’s entry of
final judgment as to the Non-Release Plaintiffs pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and over the interlocutory appeals with respect to
the Release Plaintiffs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
“We exercise plenary review of a district court’s order
granting or denying summary judgment, applying the same
standard as the district court . . . .” Tri-M Grp., LLC v. Sharp,
638 F.3d 406, 415 (3d Cir. 2011). We will affirm only if
“drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . .
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.
(quoting Ruehl v. Viacom, Inc., 500 F.2d 375, 380 n.6 (3d Cir.
2007)). Because the District Court adopted in substance the
Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation, with the
modifications we have set forth, in most respects effectively we
are reviewing the Magistrate Judge’s proposed disposition of the
case. We thus reference primarily the Magistrate Judge’s report
and recommendation rather than the opinion of the District
Court though to a degree we treat the documents
interchangeably.

IV. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Due to the complexity of this ERISA case, we think it
best to set forth the background legal framework that governs
this matter before we turn to a review of the District Court’s
disposition of this case. We start from the core principle that it
is well-established that “ERISA does not mandate the creation
16

of pension plans.” Dade v. North Am. Philips Corp., 68 F.3d
1558, 1561 (3d Cir. 1995). “Nor does ERISA mandate what
kind of benefits employers must provide if they choose to have
such a plan.” Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 887, 116
S.Ct. 1783, 1788 (1996); see also Smith v. Contini, 205 F.3d
597, 602 (3d Cir. 2000) (“ERISA neither mandates the creation
of pension plans nor in general dictates the benefits to be
afforded once a plan is created.”). Instead, Congress enacted
ERISA to ensure that “if a worker has been promised a defined
pension benefit upon retirement — and if he has fulfilled
whatever conditions are required to obtain a vested benefit — he
will actually receive it.” Spink, 517 U.S. at 887, 116 S.Ct. at
1788 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[o]nly the plan
itself can create an entitlement to benefits.” Bellas v. CBS, Inc.,
221 F.3d 517, 522 (3d Cir. 2000). “Accordingly, we are
required to enforce the [p]lan as written unless we find a
provision of ERISA that contains a contrary directive.” Dade,
68 F.3d at 1562; see also Smith, 205 F.3d at 602 (same). 9
By their plain terms, the Siemens Plans do not provide
for PJS benefits. The Magistrate Judge found, however, that
ERISA sections 208 and 204(g) controlled the transactions that
led to the creation of the Siemens Plans and that by reason of
9

In point of fact, since Congress originally adopted ERISA it has
from time to time amended the statute to limit plan sponsors’
power to determine the ERISA benefits and collective
bargaining agreements sometimes also address plans’ benefits.
But the basic principle that the employer determines the benefits
remains.
17

those sections appellees are entitled to PJS benefits. We thus
turn to those provisions.
ERISA section 208 provides, in relevant part:
A pension plan may not merge or consolidate
with, or transfer its assets or liabilities to, any
other plan after September 2, 1974, unless each
participant in the plan would (if the plan then
terminated) receive a benefit immediately after
the merger, consolidation, or transfer which is
equal to or greater than the benefit he would have
been entitled to receive immediately before the
merger, consolidation, or transfer (if the plan had
then terminated).
29 U.S.C. § 1058. In Gillis v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 4 F.3d
1137, 1150 (3d Cir. 1993), then-Judge Alito summarized in his
concurring opinion the operation of section 208:
[Section 208 and its Internal Revenue
Code counterpart, 26 U.S.C. § 414(l)10] require us
10

“When Title I of ERISA was enacted to impose substantive
legal requirements on employee pension plans (including the
anti-cutback rule), Title II of ERISA amended the Internal
Revenue Code to condition the eligibility of pension plans for
preferential tax treatment on compliance with many of the Title I
requirements.” Central Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541
U.S. 739, 746, 124 S.Ct. 2230, 2236-37 (2004). “The result was
a ‘curious duplicate structure’ with nearly verbatim replication
in the Internal Revenue Code of whole sections of text from
18

to compare (a) the benefits, if any, that the
[participants] would have received if the
[original] [p]lan had terminated just before the
[merger or transfer] . . . with (b) the benefits, if
any, that the [participants] would have received if
the [successor] [p]lan had terminated just after the
[merger or] transfer.
In order to determine the benefits that the
[participants] would have received upon
termination of the plans at these two points in
time, it is necessary to look to Section 4044 of
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1344, which prescribes the
order in which the assets of a single-employer
defined benefit plan are allocated among
participants and beneficiaries at termination. The
effect of all of these provisions — 26 U.S.C. §
414(l) and 29 U.S.C. §§ 1058 and 1344 — when
read together [is] to require that any allocation of
assets to the [participants’] early retirement
benefits that would have occurred upon
termination of the [original] [p]lan just before the
[merger or] transfer not exceed the allocation of
Title I of ERISA.” Id., 124 S.Ct. at 2237. Section 208 is
replicated in 26 U.S.C. § 414(l) and section 204(g) in 26 U.S.C.
§ 411(d)(6). When interpreting ERISA, we thus take guidance
from the parallel provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, along
with Treasury regulations and Revenue Rulings implementing
and interpreting those provisions. See Gillis, 4 F.3d at 1144.
19

assets to those benefits that would have occurred
upon termination of the [successor] [p]lan just
after the [merger or] transfer.
Id. Thus, section 208 essentially requires that a plan participant
receive no less benefits upon a hypothetical termination of the
successor plan just following the merger or transfer of assets or
liabilities than the participant would have received upon a
hypothetical termination of his or her original plan just prior to
the merger or transfer.
Section 204(g), known as the anti-cutback rule, “prohibits
an employer from decreasing or eliminating a participant’s
accrued benefits by plan amendment.” Bellas, 221 F.3d at 522.
Thus, section 204(g) follows the principles of section 208 in
protecting plan participants. In the case of a defined benefit
plan, ERISA defines, in a somewhat circular fashion, an
“accrued benefit” as a participant’s “accrued benefit determined
under the plan and . . . expressed in the form of an annual
benefit commencing at normal retirement age.” 29 U.S.C. §
1002(23)(A). Because early retirement benefits by definition
commence prior to normal retirement age, those benefits were
not considered “accrued” under ERISA prior to 1984. See
Bellas, 221 F.3d at 523 n.2 (citing Bencivenga v. Western Pa.
Teamsters and Emp’rs Pension Fund, 763 F.2d 574, 577 (3d Cir.
1985)). In 1984, however, Congress amended section 204(g)
and extended the protection it afforded to early retirement
benefits and retirement-type subsidies. See Retirement Equity
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, § 301(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1426,
1450-51. As amended, section 204(g) now provides:

20

(g) Decrease of accrued benefits through
amendment of plan
(1) The accrued benefit of a participant
under a plan may not be decreased by an
amendment of the plan, other than an
amendment
described
in
section
1082(d)(2) or 1441 of this title.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), a plan
amendment which has the effect of –
(A) eliminating or reducing an
early retirement benefit or a
retirement-type subsidy (as defined
in regulations), or
(B) eliminating an optional form of
benefit,
with respect to benefits attributable
to service before the amendment
shall be treated as reducing accrued
benefits.
In the case of a
retirement-type
subsidy,
the
preceding sentence shall apply only
with respect to a participant who
satisfies (either before or after the
amendment) the preamendment
conditions for the subsidy.

21

29 U.S.C. § 1054(g).
Although section 204(g) prohibits cutback of accrued
benefits by plan amendment, a determination under section 208
of a participant’s pension and benefits entitlement on a
hypothetical termination basis requires that a court also consider
section 204(g) because a plan termination is regarded as an
“amendment” for the purposes of section 204(g). See Gillis, 4
F.3d at 1145. As Judge Alito observed in his concurring opinion
in Gillis, “[w]hile neither [s]ection 204(g) of ERISA nor
[s]ection 414(l) of the Internal Revenue Code expressly states
that a termination must be regarded as an amendment for these
purposes,” the Internal Revenue Service has concluded in a
Revenue Ruling that plan terminations are subject to the
provisions of section 204(g). Id. at 1150 (Alito, J., concurring)
(citing Revenue Ruling 85-6). Furthermore, the Treasury
regulations implementing the Internal Revenue Code
counterpart to ERISA section 204(g), 26 U.S.C. § 411, provide
that “[t]he prohibition against the reduction or elimination of
section 411(d)(6) protected benefits already accrued applies to
plan mergers, spinoffs, transfers, and transactions amending or
having the effect of amending a plan or plans to transfer plan
benefits.” 26 C.F.R. § 1.411(d)-4, A-2(a)(3)(i). 11
11

As we observed in Dade, “the legislative history of the 1984
amendments indicates that Congress intended early retirement
benefits to have the same protection in a plan termination that
they would have in an amendment.” 68 F.3d at 1563 n.2 (citing,
e.g., S. Rep. No. 98-575, at 31, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2547, 2577) (“Terminated Plans: The bill does not provide an
exception to the prohibition against reduction of benefits or
22

Those Treasury regulations apply with equal force to
section 204(g). 29 U.S.C. § 1202(c) (“Regulations proscribed
by the Secretary of the Treasury under sections 410(a), 411, and
412 of Title 26 . . . shall also apply to [their ERISA
counterparts].”); see also Heinz, 541 U.S. at 746-47, 124 S.Ct. at
2237 (observing that section 411 regulations are applicable to
section 204(g)). Accordingly, a plan participant’s benefits
protected by section 204(g) under a plan amendment must be
preserved and funded upon a hypothetical termination under
section 208 and thus not decreased or eliminated by virtue of a
plan merger or a transfer of assets or liabilities.
The present case is unusual in that we already have had
occasion to consider whether section 204(g) protects the precise
benefits at issue here. In Bellas, a former employee brought suit
against Westinghouse, by then CBS, and the Westinghouse
Pension Plan, contending that certain amendments to the plan
that narrowed the class of persons eligible for PJS benefits and
enacted the sunset provision present also in the Westinghouse
Plan at issue in this case violated ERISA section 204(g). 221
F.3d at 520-21. On interlocutory appeal, we considered whether
the PJS benefits constituted an early retirement benefit or
retirement-type subsidy protected by section 204(g). Id. at 518.
At that time, the Treasury had not, as section 204(g)
elimination of benefits options in the case of a terminated plan.
Accordingly, a plan is not to be considered to have satisfied all
of its liabilities to participants and beneficiaries until it has
provided for the payment of contingent liabilities with respect to
a participant who, after the date of the termination of a plan,
meets the requirements for a subsidized benefit.”).
23

contemplated that it would do, promulgated regulations defining
these terms. Id. at 524.
We first noted that “[b]ecause the $10.00 multiplied by
[c]redited [s]ervice and the additional $100.00 benefit do not
continue beyond normal retirement age, they cannot properly be
considered a retirement-type subsidy as contemplated by section
204(g),” and thus “could be the subject of amendment or
elimination without violating section 204(g).” Id. at 536 n.17.12
Turning to the early payment of unreduced normal retirement
benefits, we concluded that the portion of the PJS benefits that
continues beyond normal retirement age and “that is equal to the
actuarially reduced normal retirement benefit, constitutes an
early retirement benefit protected by section 204(g) but is not a
retirement-type subsidy,” and that the value of the PJS benefits
that continue beyond normal retirement age “over and above the
actuarially reduced value” is a retirement-type subsidy protected
by section 204(g). Id. at 538. 13 We further determined that
12

The district court in Bellas did not separately address this
portion of the PJS benefits in its opinion nor do the parties here
separately address these benefits in their briefs. The distinction
is of no consequence in the case at bar, however, as our holding
applies to all facets of the PJS benefits.
13

In 2006, the Secretary of the Treasury enacted regulations
defining these and other relevant terms for ERISA. Those
regulations define “early retirement benefit” and “retirementtype subsidy” in the same manner as we did in Bellas. See 26
C.F.R. § 1.411(d)-3(g)(6)(i) (“The term early retirement benefit
means the right, under the terms of the plan, to commence
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those benefits “are accrued upon their creation rather than upon
the occurrence of the unpredictable contingent event [i.e., the
plan shutdown].” Id. at 532. We accordingly held that section
204(g) protects the PJS benefits from cutback and therefore
affirmed the district court’s conclusion that Westinghouse
violated section 204(g) through enactment of the amendments.
Id. at 540. We also point out that, as we discuss at length below,
in Bellas we invalidated the sunset provision as to
Westinghouse.

V. ANALYSIS 14
distribution of a retirement-type benefit at a particular date after
severance from employment with the employer and before
normal retirement age.”); 26 C.F.R. § 1.411(d)-3(g)(6)(iii) (“The
term retirement-type benefit means (A) [t]he payment of a
distribution alternative with respect to an accrued benefit; or (B)
[t]he payment of any other benefit under a defined benefit plan .
. . that is permitted to be in a qualified pension plan, continues
after retirement, and is not an ancillary benefit.”); 26 C.F.R. §
1.411(d)-3(g)(6)(iv) (“The term retirement-type subsidy means
the excess, if any, of the actuarial present value of a retirementtype benefit over the actuarial present value of the accrued
benefit commencing at normal retirement age or at actual
commencement date, if later, with both such actuarial present
values determined as of the date the retirement-type benefit
commences.”).
14

At the outset of our analysis, we note that the Court of Appeals
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As we have already noted, the Magistrate Judge reached
her conclusion that ERISA required Siemens to offer PJS
benefits on the basis of two independent theories. First, the
Magistrate Judge determined that Siemens created an ERISA
“transition” plan for the legacy employees through the extension
of the Westinghouse Plan from August 19 to August 31, 1998.
See Shaver, 2007 WL 1006681, at *21-23. The Magistrate
Judge concluded that adoption of the Siemens Plans functioned
as an amendment of the ERISA “transition” plan and the
amendment eliminated the legacy employees’ PJS benefits in
violation of section 204(g). See id., at *24-27.
Second, the Magistrate Judge determined that
Westinghouse transferred to Siemens through the APA a portion
of Westinghouse Plan’s liabilities, thereby triggering the
for the Eleventh Circuit in a not precedential opinion has
weighed in on the Westinghouse-Siemens transaction in a
factually-indistinguishable case and determined that the legacy
employees are not entitled to PJS benefits. See McCay v.
Siemens Corp., 247 F. App’x 172 (11th Cir. 2007). In
accordance with our practice, however, we do not rely on that
opinion as it is not precedential. We nevertheless make
reference to McCay because we think that it is important to note
that Siemens does not contend that principles of claim or issue
preclusion compel us to follow that case and thus we do not
address that possibility. In this regard, we point out that not
precedential opinions no less than precedential opinions can
have preclusive effect.
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applicability of section 208. See id., at *20. The Magistrate
Judge appeared to conclude that independently of section
204(g), section 208 required that the Siemens Plans “provide
equal or greater benefits” than those of the Westinghouse Plan.
See id., at *27. Turning to section 204(g), the Magistrate Judge
concluded also that in light of our holding in Bellas that PJS
benefits under the Westinghouse Plan are protected from
cutback, section 204(g) also required that Siemens offer PJS
benefits. Id., at *27-28.
We first consider whether Siemens established an ERISA
“transition” plan, the less complex of the two theories. We then
proceed to the hyper-complicated question of the applicability of
ERISA sections 208 and 204(g).
A. AN ERISA TRANSITION PLAN
ERISA applies to “any employee benefit plan if it is
established or maintained . . . by any employer engaged in
commerce . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a). Surprisingly, however,
ERISA does not define the term “plan.” In the absence of a
congressional definition, we have “adopted the test developed in
Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir. 1982) (en
banc), to determine whether informal written or oral
communications . . . constitute a plan.” Smith v. Hartford Ins.
Grp., 6 F.3d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Deibler v. United
Food & Commercial Workers’ Local Union 23, 973 F.2d 206,
209 (3d Cir. 1992); Henglein v. Informal Plan For Plant
Shutdown Benefits, 974 F.2d 391, 399-400 (3d Cir. 1992)).
Under Donovan, an ERISA plan “is established if from the
surrounding circumstances a reasonable person can ascertain the
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intended benefits, a class of beneficiaries, the source of
financing, and procedures for receiving benefits.” 688 F.2d at
1373. Looking to these factors, the Magistrate Judge concluded
that Siemens adopted an ERISA “transition” plan for the
thirteen-day period from August 19 to August 31, 1998, by
virtue of Westinghouse’s extension of its pension plan to cover
the legacy employees during that time.
Siemens challenges this conclusion on multiple grounds.
It contends that ERISA plans are permanent or at least long-term
programs and that the patently temporary nature of the thirteenday extension precludes it from being classified as an ERISA
plan. Appellants’ br. at 53-54. Siemens also contends that even
if a temporary extension of one ERISA plan could qualify as the
establishment of a second and distinct ERISA plan,
Westinghouse — not Siemens — was the plan sponsor and
administrator during the thirteen-day period. Id. at 54-55. In
this vein, Siemens points to the facts that Westinghouse was
liable for any benefits that came due to a beneficiary under the
plan during the thirteen-day period and Siemens’ only obligation
with respect to that period was to reimburse Westinghouse for
any actuarial pension losses caused by Siemens’ termination of a
legacy employee without cause during that time. Id. at 56.
For the thirteen-day period at issue, a reasonable person
could have ascertained the benefits under the Westinghouse
Plan, identified the beneficiaries, the source of financing, and
procedures for receiving benefits. We thus concur with the
Magistrate Judge and, by extension with the District Court, that
there was an ERISA plan in place from August 19 to August 31,
1998, for the legacy employees. The critical question, however,
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is not whether there was a sponsor maintaining an ERISA plan
during the thirteen-day period; it is whether Siemens
“established or maintained” that plan, 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a), i.e.,
whether, in ERISA parlance, Siemens was the “plan sponsor,”
see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(B).
The District Court found that Siemens maintained the
plan because it determined that Siemens had administrative and
financial responsibilities with respect to the plan during the
thirteen-day period. But in reaching this conclusion, the Court
relied solely on the fact that Siemens was obligated to reimburse
Westinghouse for any actuarial pension loss that Siemens’
termination of a legacy employee caused during the period. We,
however, are satisfied that, contrary to the District Court’s
conclusion, Siemens’ duty to reimburse Westinghouse for any
losses that Siemens caused by termination of a legacy employee
from August 19 to August 31, 1998, demonstrates quite clearly
that Siemens was not responsible for the pension obligations that
came due during this time period under the Westinghouse Plan.
In fact, there is no factual dispute that at all times of the
Westinghouse Plan’s existence, including the thirteen-day
period, Westinghouse has been and is currently responsible for
the maintenance, administration, and funding of its plan.
Siemens’ singular promise of reimbursement to Westinghouse in
the event that Siemens terminated a legacy employee describes
the entirety of Siemens’ obligations in relation to the
Westinghouse Plan from August 19 to August 31, 1998, and
plainly does not constitute the administrative undertaking that an
ERISA plan requires. After all, an obligation to make payments
to a plan sponsor cannot possibly be equated with the
obligations attendant to establishing or maintaining a plan.
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On this issue, we take instruction from the Supreme
Court’s seminal ERISA opinion in Fort Halifax Packing Co. v.
Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 2211 (1987), in which the Court
considered an ERISA preemption claim. Under ERISA, any
state law that “relate[s] to any employee benefit plan described
in [section] 1003(a)” is preempted. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). In
Fort Halifax, the Court considered whether ERISA preempted a
Maine statute requiring employers to provide a one-time
severance payment to employees in the event of a plant closing.
482 U.S. at 4-5, 107 S.Ct. at 2213-14. The Court concluded that
ERISA did not preempt the Maine statute because it was not an
ERISA “plan,” and in this regard stated:
The requirement of a one-time, lump-sum
payment triggered by a single event requires no
administrative scheme whatsoever to meet the
employer’s obligation. The employer assumes no
responsibility to pay benefits on a regular basis,
and thus faces no periodic demands on its assets
that create a need for financial coordination and
control. Rather, the employer’s obligation is
predicated on the occurrence of a single
contingency that may never materialize. The
employer may well never have to pay the
severance benefits. To the extent that the
obligation to do so arises, satisfaction of that duty
involves making a single set of payments to
employees at the time the plant closes. To do
little more than write a check hardly constitutes
the operation of a benefit plan. Once this single
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event is over, the employer has no further
responsibility. The theoretical possibility of a
one-time obligation in the future simply creates
no need for an ongoing administrative program
for processing claims and paying benefits.
Id. at 12, 107 S.Ct. at 2218 (emphasis in original). Fort Halifax
thus makes clear that the payment of benefits “do[es] not
implicate ERISA unless [it] require[s] the establishment and
maintenance of a separate and ongoing administrative scheme.”
Angst v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 969 F.2d 1530, 1538 (3d Cir.
1992); see also Kulinski v. Medtronic Bio-Medicus Inc., 21 F.3d
254, 257 (8th Cir. 1994) (“The pivotal inquiry is whether the
plan requires the establishment of a separate, ongoing
administrative scheme to administer the plan’s benefits.”).
To contrast with the simplicity of the single payment that
the statute that the Court considered in Fort Halifax required, the
Court provided substantial guidance on what constitutes an
ERISA “administrative scheme,” an obligation that goes far
beyond making a single payment. The Court elaborated:
An employer that makes a commitment
systematically to pay certain benefits undertakes a
host of obligations, such as determining the
eligibility of claimants, calculating benefit levels,
making disbursements, monitoring the availability
of funds for benefit payments, and keeping
appropriate records in order to comply with
applicable reporting requirements.
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482 U.S. at 9, 107 S.Ct. at 2216. Thus, an ERISA
administrative scheme “may arise where the employer, to
determine the employee’s eligibility for and level of benefits,
must analyze each employee’s particular circumstances in light
of the appropriate criteria.” Kulinski, 21 F.3d at 257; Bogue v.
Ampex Corp., 976 F.2d 1319, 1323 (9th Cir. 1992) (An ERISA
“administrative scheme” is one in which “the circumstances of
each employee’s termination [are] analyzed in light of [certain]
criteria.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Factors relevant to determining whether an employer’s
undertakings have created an ERISA plan also include whether
the “undertaking requires managerial discretion, that is, whether
the undertaking could not be fulfilled without ongoing,
particularized, administrative, analysis of each case” and
whether “a reasonable employee would perceive an ongoing
commitment by the employer to provide some employee
benefits.” Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., 274
F.3d 706, 737 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). On the other hand, “[s]imple or mechanical
determinations do not necessarily require the establishment of
such an administrative scheme.” Kulinski, 21 F.3d at 257.
The narrow scope of Siemens’ obligations with respect to
the thirteen-day period when considered against the
“administrative scheme” analysis of Fort Halifax makes it quite
clear that Siemens did not establish or maintain the ERISA plan
that was in place from August 19 to August 31, 1998.
Westinghouse — not Siemens — determined a plan participant’s
eligibility for benefits arising under the Westinghouse Plan from
August 19 to August 31, 1998, and Westinghouse calculated the
quantum of those benefits and disbursed the funds due to the
32

participants in that period. Further, Westinghouse funded the
plan during that time and engaged in the extensive financial
monitoring and record-keeping that the plan required.
In contrast, during the thirteen-day period Siemens had
only the contingent, discrete obligation to reimburse
Westinghouse Plan in the event Siemens terminated a legacy
employee without cause prior to September 1, 1998, and the
terminated employees, if any, were merely a subset of the
entirety of the legacy employees. That contingent financial
burden — which notably Siemens never incurred as it did not
terminate any legacy employee prior to September 1 — was
“predicated on the occurrence of a single contingency that may
never [and in this case did not] materialize.” See Fort Halifax,
468 U.S. at 12, 107 S.Ct. at 2218. Siemens’ contingent
obligation to reimburse Westinghouse after the fact did not
require Siemens to make any administrative determination, see
id., much less require it to analyze the legacy employees’
particular circumstances and eligibility for benefits. While
contingent or one-time pension or benefit obligations that
require an administrative undertaking for their effectuation may,
in some circumstances, constitute an ERISA plan, see Pane v.
RCA Corp., 868 F.2d 631, 633-35 (3d Cir. 1989), in this case
Siemens’ contingent, one-time obligation to reimburse
Westinghouse did not.
Although we are unaware of any earlier case in which we
have considered an arrangement quite like the one here, in
which after a successor employer employed legacy employees
the original employer continued to offer for a brief period the
legacy employees benefit credit for service and compensation,
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we find additional guidance from our decision in Angst. In that
case, we considered whether a company’s offer of a one-time,
lump-sum $75,000 severance payment and a one-year extension
of benefits under its pension plan pursuant to a “buyout plan”
aimed at encouraging senior employees to leave their
employment voluntarily constituted an ERISA plan. 969 F.2d at
1532-33. We concluded that in light of Fort Halifax the $75,000
payment was not an ERISA plan because the arrangement
“would require no ongoing administrative scheme.” Id. at 1538.
We further determined that because the one-year extension of
benefits was administered pursuant to a benefits plan that was
already in existence and the extension “did not require the
creation of a new administrative scheme, and did not materially
alter an existing administrative scheme,” that facet of the buyout
plan similarly did not implicate ERISA. Id. at 1539. As in
Angst, here the extension of the already-extant Westinghouse
Plan for thirteen days did not require Siemens to create a
separate, new administrative scheme. Nor did that extension
alter the Westinghouse Plan’s existing administrative scheme; it
merely added a contingent step subsequent to the operation of
the plan.
Although we conclude that Siemens did not establish an
ERISA “transition” plan by virtue of the thirteen-day
arrangement from August 19 to August 31, 1998, because that
arrangement did not require Siemens to perform the
administrative undertaking that is the hallmark of an ERISA
plan, we note that the short duration of the arrangement likewise
counsels against finding that, if there had been any plan, it was
Siemens that established the plan. We have made clear that
“[t]he crucial factor in determining whether a ‘plan’ has been
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established is whether [the employer has expressed an intention]
to provide benefits on a regular and long-term basis.’” Deibler,
973 F.2d at 209 (quoting Wickman v. Northwestern Nat’l Ins.
Co., 908 F.2d 1077, 1083 (1st Cir. 1990)). Consistent with this
pronouncement, the relevant Treasury regulations provide:
The term ‘plan’ implies a permanent as
distinguished from a temporary program. Thus . .
. the abandonment of the plan for any reason other
than business necessity within a few years after it
has taken effect will be evidence that the plan
from its inception was not a bona fide program for
the exclusive benefit of employees in general.
26 C.F.R. § 1.401-1(b)(2) (emphasis added); see also 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (“A pension plan within the meaning of
section 401(a) is a plan established and maintained by an
employer primarily to provide systematically for the payment of
definitely determinable benefits to his employees over a period
of years, usually for life, after retirement.”). Although we
cannot draw a bright temporal line dividing ERISA plans from
short-term, discrete benefit arrangements that do not implicate
ERISA, we are confident that the thirteen-day arrangement here
is of the latter type.
We note finally on the “transition” plan issue that
Siemens’ status as the legacy employees’ actual employer during
the thirteen-day window does not preclude us from concluding
that Westinghouse maintained an ERISA plan for those persons
during that time. ERISA defines an employee pension benefit
plan as one “established or maintained by an employer or by an
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employee organization, or by both.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A).
Under ERISA, however, “[t]he term ‘employer’ means any
person acting directly as an employer, or indirectly in the
interest of an employer, in relation to an employee benefit plan.”
29 U.S.C. § 1002(5) (emphasis added). ERISA thus recognizes
that entities other than the participant’s employer may establish
or maintain an ERISA plan. See also Curtiss-Wright Corp. v.
Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78, 115 S.Ct. 1223, 1228 (1995)
(“Employers or other plan sponsors are generally free under
ERISA, for any reason at any time, to adopt, modify, or
terminate welfare plans.”) (emphasis added).
Here,
Westinghouse acted “indirectly in the interest of an employer
[i.e., Siemens], in relation to an employee benefit plan” for the
thirteen-day period. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5). The circumstance
that the beneficiaries of the Westinghouse Plan during that time
period included persons whom Siemens then employed does not
thereby make Siemens a co-sponsor of the plan when in reality
Siemens neither funded nor administered the plan.
In short, although there was an ERISA plan in place for
legacy employees from August 19 to August 31, 1998, that plan
was the Westinghouse Plan, which Westinghouse sponsored,
funded, operated and administered. We thus conclude that
Siemens did not establish an ERISA “transition” plan.
Consequently, Siemens did not provide PJS benefits to its
employees during that time, and its later adoption of the
Siemens Plans, which lacked PJS benefits, could not constitute
an “amendment” of a “transition” plan in violation of section
204(g), as Siemens had not established any plan to amend.
Therefore, we reject the Magistrate Judge’s first theory
supporting Siemens’ liability because she founded that theory on
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the incorrect conclusion that Siemens created an ERISA
“transition” plan containing PJS benefits for the period from
August 19 to August 31, 1998.
B. A TRANSFER OF LIABILITIES UNDER SECTION 208
We now turn to the Magistrate Judge’s second theory
supporting her belief that Siemens would be liable in the
absence of the releases. She predicated this conclusion on her
belief that Westinghouse through the APA transferred a portion
of the Westinghouse Plan’s liabilities to the Siemens Plans and
thus we now turn our attention to section 208. In considering
this second theory we first address the applicability of section
208, which applies where a plan “merge[s] or consolidate[s]
with, or transfer[s] its assets or liabilities to” another plan. 29
U.S.C. § 1058. Though appellees concede that the APA did not
provide for a plan consolidation, merger, or a transfer of plan
assets, they contend that section 208 applies because the APA
provided for the Westinghouse Plan to transfer liabilities to the
Siemens Plans. The District Court accepted this argument.
Section 208 does not set forth explicitly the
circumstances in which there is a transfer of liabilities, nor do
ERISA’s other provisions provide a definition of the term. We
are not, however, without guidance on this point as the
corresponding Treasury Regulation states:
A ‘transfer of assets or liabilities’ occurs when
there is a diminution of assets or liabilities with
respect to one plan and the acquisition of these
assets or the assumption of these liabilities by
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another plan. For example, the shifting of assets
or liabilities pursuant to a reciprocity agreement
between two plans in which one plan assumes
liabilities of another plan is a transfer of assets or
liabilities.
26 C.F.R. § 1.414(l)-1(b)(3). To determine whether there has
been a transfer of plan liabilities within this definition in this
case, we turn to the APA.
1. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE APA
At its broadest, the APA provided in paragraph 5.5(a)(ii)
that
Notwithstanding the more specific
provisions set forth in this Section 5.5, [Siemens]
shall provide compensation and benefit plans and
arrangements which in the aggregate are
comparable . . . to the compensation, Plans and
Benefit Arrangements in effect for [the legacy
employees] on [September 1, 1998] for a period
of not less than two years following [September 1,
1998].
J.A. 137 (emphasis added). 15
15

Paragraph 5.5(d)(i)

Siemens points out that in a certification required by the APA
it was stated that Siemens’ benefits were “in the aggregate
comparable” to those provided by Westinghouse. Appellants’
br. at 11. That fact, however, is not material to our disposition
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provided in more precise terms that Siemens
shall establish a defined benefit pension plan
intended to qualify under Section 401(a) of the
Code for the benefit of [the legacy employees]
(the ‘Purchaser Pension Plan’) that contains terms
and conditions that are substantially identical with
respect to all substantive provisions to those of
the Westinghouse Pension Plan as in effect as of
[September 1, 1998] . . . and that credits
compensation . . . and service for purposes of
eligibility (including early retirement eligibility
and any early retirement supplemental benefit),
and vesting which was credited under the
[Westinghouse] Pension Plan, provided, however,
that the [Siemens] Pension Plan will include
provisions which are consistent with (ii) through
(iv) below and will be administered . . . so that the
aggregate of the benefits under the
[Westinghouse] Pension Plan and the [Siemens]
Pension Plan are the same with respect to [the
legacy employees] as if the . . . [e]mployees
continued employment with [Westinghouse or one
of its sold subsidiaries].
Id. at 138 (emphasis omitted and added). 16
of this case.
16

Notably, there is some discord between the requirement in
paragraph 5.5(a)(ii) that Siemens provide benefits “which in the
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The Magistrate Judge found that “the contractual
obligation to provide substantially identical benefits to the
transferring employees can be construed to be a transfer of
[p]lan liability.” Shaver, 2007 WL 1006682, at *19. While
paragraph 5.5(d)(i) may suggest that the parties intended to
impose liabilities on Siemens, Siemens’ contractual promise to
provide substantially identical benefits surely does not constitute
an assumption of Westinghouse Plan’s liabilities, as an
agreement to provide benefits is discrete from an agreement to
assume another employer’s obligation to provide benefits.
Indeed, as we have noted already, after September 1, 1998, the
Westinghouse Plan remained in existence and continued to
provide legacy employees with benefits that they accrued prior
to that date. We therefore consider the more specific provisions
of the APA, which require close examination.

aggregate are comparable” to the benefits of the Westinghouse
Plan and the requirement in paragraph 5.5(d)(i) that Siemens
provide “substantially identical benefits” to the legacy
employees as it would seem to be obvious that benefits could be
“comparable” without being “substantially identical.” While not
a critical matter in light of the more detailed provisions of the
APA, we believe that to the extent that the requirements are
inconsistent the former takes precedence over the latter because
paragraph 5.5(a)(ii) states that Siemens shall provide
“comparable” benefits “[n]otwithstanding the more specific
provisions set forth in . . . Section 5.5.” See Black’s Law
Dictionary 1168 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “notwithstanding” as
“[d]espite; in spite of”).
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Section 2.3 of the APA provides, in relevant part:
(a) Assumed Liabilities. Upon the terms
and subject to the conditions of this Agreement . .
. , [Siemens] hereby agrees to assume, effective as
of [September 1, 1998], and agrees to pay,
perform and discharge when due all of the
following Liabilities of [Westinghouse] (except
Excluded Liabilities) arising out of, relating to or
otherwise in respect of the Acquired Assets, the
Business or the operations of the Business before,
on or after [September 1, 1998] (collectively, the
‘Assumed Liabilities’):
...
(vii) all liabilities arising under or
in connection with any Plan or Benefit
Arrangement;
...
(b) Excluded Liabilities. Any provision of
this Agreement to the contrary notwithstanding . .
. , the following liabilities (the ‘Excluded
Liabilities’) of [Westinghouse] and [its] Sold
Subsidiaries are excluded and shall not be
assumed or discharged by [Siemens]:
...
(x) any Liabilities with respect to
Plans and Benefit Arrangements retained
by [Westinghouse] under Section 5.5; and
(xi) any other Liabilities not
assumed by [Siemens] pursuant to the
provisions of Section 2.3(a).
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J.A. 133-35 (some emphasis added).
Under paragraph 2.3(a)(viii), Siemens assumed “[a]ll
[l]iabilities arising under or in connection with any Plan or
Benefit Arrangement.” The APA defines “Plan” as:
any plan, program, agreement or arrangement,
whether or not written, that is or was an
‘employee benefit plan’ as such term is defined in
Section 3(3) of ERISA, whether or not subject to
ERISA and whether or not maintained in the U.S.,
and (a) which is maintained by [Westinghouse] or
[its] Sold Subsidiaries, (b) to which
[Westinghouse] or [its] Sold Subsidiaries
contribute or fund or provide benefits; or (c)
which provides or promises benefits to any person
who performs or who has performed services for
[Westinghouse] or [its] Sold Subsidiaries and
because of those services is or has been (i) a
participant therein or (ii) entitled to benefits
thereunder.
Id. 127. The Westinghouse Plan is a “plan” within the meaning
of paragraph 2.3(a)(viii). Accordingly, Siemens assumed all of
Westinghouse Plan’s liabilities except those which
Westinghouse retained under section 5.5.
In relevant part, section 5.5 provided that the
“[Westinghouse] Pension Plan shall retain liability with respect
to [the legacy employees] for their accrued benefit calculated as
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of [September 1, 1998], subject to [certain adjustments].” Id.
138-39.
Paragraph 5.5(d)(iv), however, qualifies
Westinghouse’s retention of accrued-benefit liability by stating:
[Siemens] Pension Plan shall be solely
responsible for (and the [Westinghouse] Pension
Plan shall not provide for) (A) any early
retirement supplement that becomes payable with
respect to a [legacy employee] retiring after
[September 1, 1998] that is the result of a
‘Pension Event’ as defined in subsection (v)[17] . .
. , (B) any benefits pursuant to Section 19 [the
PJS provision] of the [Westinghouse] Pension
Plan and the corresponding provision of the
[Siemens] Pension Plan, in excess of the benefits
that would otherwise be payable if those sections
17

Paragraph 5.5(d)(v) in turn defined a “Pension Event” as
encompassing “(A) a Disposition, (B) a closing of a plant or
plants by [Siemens] or a reduction in the number of [legacy
employees] employed by [Siemens] and its Affiliates as a result
of action requiring the filing of a notice under the Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act . . . , or (C) any
action of [Siemens] or its Affiliates that provides an incentive to
[legacy employees] to terminate or retire prior to their Normal
Retirement Date.” J.A. 140. Relatedly, paragraph 5.5(d)(v)
stated that Siemens “shall indemnify [Westinghouse] for any
actuarial losses . . . with respect to the [Westinghouse] Pension
Plan resulting from [any early retirements triggered by the
enumerated Pension Events].” Id.
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did not apply, with respect to a [legacy employee]
who retires or terminates employment with
[Siemens] and its Affiliates after [September 1,
1998], and (C) any other early retirement subsidy
or supplement with respect to [legacy employees]
that is not described in [Section 5 of the
Westinghouse Pension Plan].
Id. 139-40. The additional provisions of section 5.5 added by
amendment to the APA delineate further Siemens’ and
Westinghouse’s respective scopes of liability from August 19 to
August 31, 1998; however, they do not alter the pre-existing
provisions of section 5.5 recited above.
Taken together, paragraphs 2.3(a)(viii), 5.5(d)(iii), and
5.5(d)(iv) demonstrate that Siemens assumed a portion of
Westinghouse Plan’s pension obligations. Specifically, after
adoption of the APA, Siemens was and is liable for the early
retirement supplements that come due because of a “Pension
Event,” for any PJS benefits payable under the Westinghouse
Plan with respect to a legacy employee who retires after
September 1, 1998, 18 and any other early retirement subsidy or
18

Of course, the liability for PJS benefits was dependent on such
benefits being due, and as we explain later the APA did not
impose liability for PJS benefits for job separations after August
31, 1998. Plainly, in the complex APA Westinghouse was
covering itself on this point as paragraph 5.5(d)(iv) made
Siemens liable only for “any” PJS benefits after September 1,
1998, language that readily accommodates a situation in which
there are no such benefits. Moreover, the sunset provision that
44

supplement besides that provided for in section 5 of the
Westinghouse Plan. 19 In this regard, the Westinghouse Plan’s
liabilities have been diminished, thus triggering the applicability
of section 208.
Siemens presents an array of arguments that it contends
precludes a finding that the APA provided for the Westinghouse
Plan to transfer liabilities to the Siemens Plans in accordance
with section 208. It contends that because paragraph 5.5(d)(iv)
“addressed only a tiny subset of retirement benefits offered by
Westinghouse — those providing special early retirement for
certain employees who retired prior to age 62 — that are not
claimed by [appellees] here and are not at issue in this case,” any
liabilities transferred for those benefits are irrelevant.
Appellants’ br. at 47. In a somewhat contradictory argument,
Siemens contends that even if Westinghouse transferred some
obligations to Siemens, “the contingent and inchoate
responsibility for PJS benefits and early retirement supplements
. . . [are] not ‘liabilities’ within the meaning of [s]ection 208.”
was in existence when the APA was executed, though as we will
explain we later invalidated, made it clear that there could not be
PJS benefits for job terminations after September 1, 1998.
19

One example of such an early retirement supplement for which
Westinghouse is apparently no longer responsible lies in section
20 of the Westinghouse Plan, which provides for a “Special
Early Retirement Supplement,” based on age and years of
service, to be paid as a monthly pension until the employee
reaches sixty-two years of age. J.A. 351.
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Id. at 50. Finally, Siemens contends that the APA could not
have provided for a transfer to Siemens of a portion of
Westinghouse Plan’s liabilities because a transfer of liabilities
without a transfer of equivalent assets “would leave both plans
out of compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements.”20
Id. at 41. These contentions are unconvincing.
Though the events here differ from the ordinary scenario
that triggers the applicability of section 208, we can find nothing
within section 208 or the applicable Treasury regulations
indicating that only a transfer of all of a plan’s assets or
liabilities will activate that provision. Indeed, 26 C.F.R. §
1.414(l)-1(b)(3) defines a transfer of liabilities as “a diminution
of . . . liabilities,” not a total elimination of liabilities. See
Black’s Law Dictionary 524 (9th ed. 2009) (Diminution means
“[t]he act or process of decreasing, lessening, or taking away.”).
Furthermore, as shown above, Siemens assumed liability for
any PJS benefits that became payable under the Westinghouse
Plan for an employee who was terminated after September 1,
1998. 21
20

This argument is remarkable because it seems to be predicated
on the principle that parties could not do anything illegal
because to do so would be illegal. Oh that this would be so. On
the other hand, though unlikely, it might mean that in a case of
ambiguity the scope of a party’s undertakings should be
measured in such a way that they are lawful.

21

As we explain below, Siemens’ assumption of this liability
was effectively hollow, as an employee who Siemens terminated
would not be eligible for PJS benefits under the Westinghouse
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Siemens’ contention that responsibility for PJS benefits
and other early retirement benefits do not constitute liabilities
within the meaning of section 208 is likewise unavailing. As we
have indicated, section 208 does not define liabilities. In the
Senate Report to the 1984 amendments, however, Congress
made clear its view that contingent or otherwise putative
obligations constitute “liabilities” on a plan termination basis
under ERISA. See S. Rep. No. 98-575, at 31, 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2577 (“[A] plan is not to be considered to have
satisfied all of its liabilities to participants and beneficiaries until
it has provided for the payment of contingent liabilities with
respect to a participant who, after the date of the termination of
a plan, meets the requirements for a subsidized benefit.”)
(emphasis added); see also Gillis, 4 F.3d at 1147 (treating
liability for early retirement benefits as “liabilities” under
section 208).
Finally on this point, we note that section 208 applies
when a pension plan “transfer[s] its assets or liabilities” to
another plan, 29 U.S.C. § 1058 (emphasis added), and thus
plainly does not require a transfer of assets to trigger its
provisions. The question of whether Westinghouse’s transfer of
liabilities without a concomitant transfer of assets rendered the
Westinghouse Plan and Siemens Plans non-compliant under
ERISA is not the issue before us on appeal.
Inasmuch as we have concluded that Westinghouse
Plan. Nevertheless, Siemens could seek to cover itself on this
point.
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transferred liabilities to the Siemens Plans within the meaning of
section 208, we turn to the distinct question of what effect, if
any, that transfer had on Siemens’ obligation, vel non, to
provide PJS benefits. As noted, the Magistrate Judge appeared
to conclude that, without regard for section 204(g), because
Westinghouse transferred liabilities to Siemens, section 208
required that the Siemens Plans “provide equal or greater
benefits,” including PJS benefits, to the benefits of the
Westinghouse Plan. See Shaver, 2007 WL 1006681, at *27.
The Magistrate Judge also determined that section 208 triggered
section 204(g), which required Siemens to offer PJS benefits.
We review each of these conclusions in turn.
2. THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 208
As we described above, section 208 guarantees that if a
pension plan consolidates with another plan or transfers its
assets or liabilities to another plan, the benefits to which plan
participants are entitled will not be reduced and the actual value
of those benefits will not be diminished. See Bigger v. Am.
Commercial Lines, 862 F.2d 1341, 1344 (8th Cir. 1988)
(Section 208 “establishes a ‘rule of benefit equivalence.’ The
value of the benefit before and after the [transaction triggering
section 208] must be equal.”) (citing 26 C.F.R. § 1.414(l)-1(n)).
In the House Report to section 208, Congress explained the
effect of section 208 and the hypothetical termination analysis it
requires:
Under the bill as passed by the House, a plan must
provide protection to participants in the case of a
merger of the plan with another plan or the
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transfer of assets or liabilities from a plan. The
value of benefits to the participant and the extent
to which the benefits have been funded is to be
protected by comparing what the participant's
benefit would be if the plan had terminated
immediately before the merger and what the
participant's benefits would be under the merged
plan had the merged plan been terminated just
after the merger. The postmerger termination
benefit may not be less than the premerger
termination benefit.
H.R. Rep. No. 93-1280, at 385 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5163.
Most often, section 208 is implicated in cases of plan
mergers or so-called “spinoff” plans, in which one plan splits
into two or more plans, see 26 C.F.R. § 1.414(l)-1(b)(4). See,
e.g., Bigger, 862 F.2d at 1344 (Section 208 “provides a specific
standard that employers can rely upon in allocating assets to
spunoff plans.”). In these circumstances, “[s]ection 208
essentially requires the employer to contemplate a hypothetical
plan termination, take a ‘snapshot’ of the benefits each
participant of the plan would receive in the event of a
termination, and then provide the aggregate present value of
these benefits to the spun-off plan.” Systems Council EM-3 v.
AT&T Corp., 159 F.3d 1376, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
There is, however, no basis to hold that the APA
contemplated the creation of a spinoff plan. The Westinghouse
Plan retained liability for the majority of the legacy employees’
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accrued benefits, and Siemens is not responsible for those
benefits. The Treasury regulation counterpart to section 208
provides, however, that “[a]ny transfer of assets or liabilities
will for purposes of section 414(l) be considered as a
combination of separate mergers and spinoffs . . . .” 26 C.F.R. §
1.414(l)-1(o). “First, the transfer is treated as a spin-off of a
new plan . . . [and] [a]ssets are therefore to be allocated to
participants’ benefits on a termination basis.” Stephen R. Bruce,
Pension Claims: Rights and Obligations 511 (2d ed. 1993).
“Second, the transfer of these assets and the associated benefit
liabilities to the second plan is treated as a merger of the spunoff plan and the second plan.” Id. Thus, as in the case of a plan
spinoff or merger, to ascertain whether and to what extent
Siemens was obligated to provide appellees PJS benefits we
necessarily must determine the extent to which the legacy
employees would have been entitled to those benefits upon a
hypothetical termination of the Westinghouse Plan prior to
Westinghouse’s transfer of its liability for those benefits. Cf.
Brillinger v. Gen. Elec. Co., 130 F.3d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1997)
(“[S]ection [208] deals with the level of post-merger benefits,
and in dealing with this issue resort must be had to those parts of
the termination provisions which deal with the analogous
subject — i.e. the level of benefits following termination.”). As
we explained previously, that determination necessarily entails
reference to section 204(g), which protects accrued benefits,
including early retirement benefits and retirement-type
subsidies, in the event of a plan amendment or a plan
termination.
This is all to say that section 208 is more nuanced than
the Magistrate Judge recognized. The section does not, as the
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Magistrate Judge determined, impose a blanket requirement that
Siemens adopt verbatim the Westinghouse Plan (or a more
generous pension plan). Rather, it protects appellees’ accrued
benefits with those benefits determined as of a hypothetical
termination of the Westinghouse Plan just prior to the transfer of
liabilities. 22 Whatever else may be said about this case, the
determination of those benefits so far as the Westinghouse Plan
by its terms provided for them is not complicated.
3. THE LEGACY EMPLOYEES’ ENTITLEMENT ON
22

Reference to the corresponding Treasury regulation governing
section 208 transactions bears the point out. That regulation
provides that in the case of a plan spinoff,
the requirements of section 414(l) will be satisfied
if (i) [a]ll of the accrued benefits of each
participant are allocated to only one of the spun
off plans, and (ii) [t]he value of the assets
allocated to each of the spun off plans is not less
than the sum of the present value of the benefits
on a termination basis in the plan before the
spinoff for all participants in that spun off plan.

26 C.F.R. § 1.414(l)-1(n)(1). In the case of a merger of two
ERISA plans, “[i]f the sum of the assets of all plans is not less
than the sum of the present values of the accrued benefit
(whether or not vested) of all plans, the requirements of section
414(l) will be satisfied by merely combining the assets and
preserving each participant’s accrued benefits.” 26 C.F.R. §
1.414(l)-1(e)(1).
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A TERMINATION BASIS
At this stage of our opinion and before we turn to the
required hypothetical termination analysis we have described
above, we address our description of PJS benefits in Bellas for it
is obvious that our characterization of the benefits in that case
clouded the disposition of this case in the District Court. For the
purposes of section 204(g), early retirement benefits and
retirement-type subsidies are considered accrued benefits and
therefore section 204(g) protects them from cutback. See 29
U.S.C. § 1054(g). Section 204(g)(2) states, however, that “[i]n
the case of a retirement-type subsidy, [section 204(g)(1)’s
protection] shall apply only with respect to a participant who
satisfies (either before or after the amendment) the
preamendment conditions for the subsidy.” 29 U.S.C. §
1054(g)(2). Section 204(g) does not provide that same explicit
qualifier on the protection of early retirement benefits. As
noted, in Bellas we conceptually bifurcated the PJS benefits,
holding that the portion of the Westinghouse PJS benefits that is
“equal to the actuarially reduced normal retirement benefit” is
an early retirement benefit, while any benefits paid in excess of
the actuarially reduced value constitutes a retirement-type
subsidy. 221 F.3d at 538. We further concluded that PJS
benefits are accrued upon their creation — not upon the
happening of the contingent event (i.e., the job separation) —
and that section 204(g) accordingly protects those benefits from
cutback. Id. at 532.
Relying on Bellas’s division of PJS
benefits into an early retirement subsidy and a retirement-type
subsidy and section 204(g)(2)’s provision regarding satisfaction
of preamendment conditions as to retirement-type subsidies, the
Magistrate Judge determined that appellees were required to
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establish that they would have been eligible for the PJS benefits
under the terms of the Westinghouse Plan upon a hypothetical
termination of that plan as to the portion of those benefits
constituting a retirement-type subsidy but they were not required
to do so as to that portion constituting an early retirement
benefit. See Shaver, 2007 WL 100681, at *20. But the
Magistrate Judge predicated her approach on a misreading of
section 204(g).
We recognize that, regrettably, section 204(g)(2) is
ambiguous, and in isolation its explicit statement that section
204(g) protects retirement-type subsidies from cutback for a
participant who satisfies, preamendment or postamendment, the
preamendment conditions placed upon the subsidy could be read
to mean that that qualifier does not apply to early retirement
benefits, particularly in view of the circumstance that section
204(g)(2)(A) addresses both “an early retirement benefit or a
retirement-type subsidy.” Thus, it might be thought that section
204(g) protects from cutback a participant’s early retirement
benefit even if the participant does not at the time of plan
amendment (or in this case plan termination) and cannot in the
future satisfy the conditions for that benefit. We have made
clear, however, that “the [Retirement Equity Act of 1984] does
not override the conditions originally imposed by the [p]lan
which defined the early retirement benefits when they were
created.” Dade, 68 F.3d at 1562. Describing the import of
section 204(g), we explained that “the fact that [amendments
eliminating or reducing early retirement benefits or retirementtype subsidies] will now be ‘treated as reducing accrued
benefits’ does not mean that Congress intends to foreclose
employers from circumscribing the availability of such optional
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benefits when they are being created.” Ashenbaugh v. Crucible
Inc., 854 F.2d 1516, 1527 (3d Cir. 1988).
As is evident from our foregoing explanation, especially
our case law, “ERISA [section] 204(g) can protect an
entitlement to benefits, but it cannot create an entitlement to
benefits when no entitlement exists under the terms of the
[p]lan.” Hein v. FDIC, 88 F.3d 210, 217 (3d Cir. 1996)
(emphasis added). Indeed, notwithstanding our conceptual
division of PJS benefits in Bellas, in that case we assumed that
section 204(g) protects early retirement benefits, along with
retirement-type subsidies, only to the extent a plan participant
satisfied or could satisfy the preamendment conditions placed
upon the early retirement benefit. We stated:
After 1984, a plan sponsor could eliminate
prospectively an early retirement benefit by
amendment, but under section 204(g) the
amendment could not adversely affect that portion
of an early retirement benefit that already had
accrued to a plan participant who satisfied the
pre-amendment conditions for the benefit either
before or after the amendment. See 29 U.S.C. §
1054(g); Dade, 68 F.3d at 1562. Thus, if the 1994
Westinghouse Plan amendments reduced or
eliminated early retirement benefits or retirementtype subsidies, the amendments would have had
to allow employees who remained employed by
CBS after the amendments to ‘grow into’ the
benefit. See id. at 1562.
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221 F.3d at 524 (emphasis added); see also Bruce, Pension
Claims 185 (“When an early retirement benefit, a retirementtype subsidy, or a benefit option is protected against reduction or
elimination, the protection is for the benefits that would be
provided under the benefit option based on the accrued benefits
up to the date of change, assuming that the participant has met
or later meets any special eligibility (or vesting) requirement for
the benefit.”) (emphasis partially omitted and partially added).
The legislative history to section 204(g) is consistent with
our precedent and reveals Congress’ intent that section 204(g)
protect only those benefits — whether classified as early
retirement benefits or retirement-type subsidies — for which a
participant meets the plan requirements. The Senate Report
states, in relevant part:
The bill generally protects the accrual of
benefits with respect to participants who have met
the requirements for a benefit as of the time a plan
is amended and participants who subsequently
meet the preamendment requirements. The bill
does not, however, prevent the reduction of a
subsidy in the case of a participant who, at the
time of separation from service (whether before or
after the plan amendment), has not met the
preamendment requirements.
...
Accordingly, the bill makes it clear that the
prohibition against reduction of a benefit subsidy
(the excess of the value of a benefit over the
actuarial equivalent of the normal retirement
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benefit) applies to a participant only if the
participant meets the conditions imposed by the
plan on the availability of the subsidy. If the
protection is afforded, an employee’s accrued
benefit is not to be less than the protected level or
the accrued benefit determined under the plan
without regard to the protection, whichever is
greater. For example, if a plan is amended to
eliminate a subsidized early retirement benefit for
employees who have completed 30 years of
service, then the plan would not be required to
provide the subsidy to an employee who never
completes 30 years of service and it would not be
required to provide benefits to such an employee
before the normal retirement age.
S. Rep. No. 98-575, at 28, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2574
(emphasis added). The provision of benefits to an employee
“before the normal retirement age” apart from the “subsidy” is,
of course, an early retirement benefit as we defined that term in
Bellas. See 221 F.3d at 538 (“[The] portion paid that is equal to
the actuarially reduced normal retirement benefit[] constitutes an
early retirement benefit.”). It is thus apparent that despite
section 204(g)’s focus on satisfaction of preamendment
conditions for retirement-type subsidies, Congress assumed in
passing section 204(g) that the provision only would protect
early retirement benefits to the extent that an employee satisfied
or can satisfy the plan conditions for the benefit.
If there was any question as to the proper interpretation
of section 204(g), the Treasury regulation implementing the
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Internal Revenue Code counterpart to section 204(g), 26 U.S.C.
§ 411, surely answers that question. As noted, Treasury
regulations implementing the Internal Revenue Code version of
the anti-cutback rule apply with equal force to section 204(g).
See 29 U.S.C. § 1202(c). The implementing regulation to
section 411 provides:
Except as provided in this section, a plan is
treated as decreasing an accrued benefit if it is
amended to eliminate or reduce a section
411(d)(6)(B) benefit as defined in paragraph
(g)(15) of this section. This paragraph (b)(1)
applies to participants who satisfy (either before
or after the plan amendment) the preamendment
conditions for a section 411(d)(6)(B) protected
benefit.
26 C.F.R. § 1.411(d)-3(b)(1)(i) (emphasis added). In turn, a
section 411(d)(6)(B) protected benefit is defined as “the portion
of an early retirement benefit, retirement-type subsidy, or an
optional form of benefit attributable to benefits accrued before
the applicable amendment date.” 26 C.F.R. § 1.411(d)-3(g)(15)
(emphasis added). Accordingly, an early retirement benefit is
considered accrued for purposes of section 411, and thus for
purposes of section 204(g), only where the plan participant at
some point satisfies the preamendment conditions for the
benefit.
In sum, we find that section 204(g) does not protect from
cutback an early retirement benefit for a plan participant who
has not satisfied and never can satisfy the conditions for
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receiving the benefits that are subject to the cutback. Indeed,
were we to conclude otherwise our opinion would have the
bizarre result that it would treat section 204(g) as protecting the
benefits of a plan participant from cutback in circumstances in
which the participant never will be eligible for those benefits.
Thus, our opinion would extend section 204(g)’s protection on
paper only to a set of phantom benefits which never actually will
vest for the participant, or, result, directly contrary to our
opinions in Ashenbaugh, Dade, and Hein, in going further in
creating an entitlement under section 204(g) where none
otherwise would exist under the terms of the plan. The first
result is unreasonable and the second is contrary to wellestablished ERISA principles. See Spink, 517 U.S. at 887, 116
S.Ct. at 1788 (ERISA guarantees that “if a worker has been
promised a defined pension benefit upon retirement — and if he
has fulfilled whatever conditions are required to obtain a vested
benefit — he will actually receive it.”) (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Firestone Tire
and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113, 109 S.Ct. 948, 956
(1989) (ERISA was enacted “to protect contractually defined
benefits.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
(emphasis added).
(a) Appellees did not and could not satisfy
the conditions for PJS benefits.
Inasmuch as we have determined that we must analyze
appellees’ entitlement to PJS benefits upon the basis of a
hypothetical termination of the plans as to the entire portion of
PJS benefits, we finally turn to the crux of this segment of our
opinion and consider whether appellees would have been
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entitled to PJS benefits upon a hypothetical termination of the
Westinghouse Plan just prior to the transfer of liabilities. In
relevant part, the Westinghouse Plan provides that:
For periods on or after January 1, 1997 and before
September 1, 1998, a Permanent Job Separation
means solely the termination of the employment
of an Employee with an Employer, Affiliated
Entity, or Excluded Unit because of job
movement or product line relocation, or location
closedown, as those terms are defined below.
J.A. 292. The Plan defines “Employer, Affiliated Entity, or
Excluded Unit” as Westinghouse or any Westinghouse
subsidiary or joint venture participating in the Westinghouse
Plan. Id. 284, 288, 292. The Plan, however, contains the
additional express limitation that “in no event shall a Permanent
Job Separation occur if an Employee is offered continued
employment by . . . a successor employer.” Id. 293.
If the Westinghouse Plan had been terminated just prior
to transferring a portion of its liabilities under the APA on
September 1, 1998, appellees plainly would not have been
eligible for PJS benefits. As of that date, appellees were
Westinghouse employees who were “offered continued
employment by . . . a successor employer,” namely, Siemens.
Nevertheless, as noted previously, under section 204(g) a plan
participant need not satisfy at the time of a plan’s termination
the conditions placed on an early retirement benefit or
retirement-type subsidy. If following the transfer of liabilities
appellees potentially could have been eligible for the
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Westinghouse Plan’s PJS benefits in the future, section 204(g)
would have protected those benefits, and appellees’ benefits
upon a hypothetical termination of the Westinghouse Plan prior
to the transfer of liabilities thus would have included PJS
benefits. Accordingly, section 208 would have protected
appellees’ PJS benefits from elimination or reduction by virtue
of the Siemens-Westinghouse transaction. Here, however, the
bar to entitlement that would have existed in a pretransfer
situation remains. Appellees did not after the transfer of
liabilities become eligible nor will they ever be eligible for PJS
benefits under the Westinghouse Plan for the same reason they
were not eligible for those benefits just prior to Westinghouse’s
transfer of liabilities — they were offered continued
employment by Siemens. Accordingly, section 204(g) did not
protect appellees’ PJS benefits from cutback and thus appellees’
benefits upon a hypothetical termination of the Westinghouse
Plan just prior to the transfer of liabilities would not have
included PJS benefits.
Notwithstanding this seemingly insurmountable obstacle
to appellees’ claim, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the
successor-employer limitation on PJS benefits was not fatal to
appellees’ claim, as she stated that “Gillis held that satisfaction
of pre-amendment conditions does not have to occur until
separation from service [and] as in Gillis, no separation from
service occurred until Siemens terminated the transferred
employees.” Shaver, 2007 WL 1006681, at *28. The
Magistrate Judge did not, however, proceed to analyze whether
appellees would have satisfied the conditions for PJS benefits
upon Siemens’ termination of appellees. Rather, she concluded
that “the APA extends the PJS benefits by contractual
60

agreement,” such that the prohibitive language in the
Westinghouse Plan did not bar appellees’ claim. Id. These
conclusions plainly were wrong.
In Gillis, Hoechst Corporation sold a division of its
business and transferred all assets and liabilities of its ERISA
plan attributable to that division to American Mirrex. 4 F.3d at
1140. There was, in other words, a plan spinoff. The American
Mirrex Plan provided that employees of that division who
transferred to American Mirrex were to “receive the same early
retirement benefits subject to the same conditions as [the
Hoechst Retirement Plan].” Id. at 1149 (Alito, J., concurring).
Plaintiffs were transferred employees who, at the time of
transfer, had not met the age and years-of-service requirements
to qualify for early retirement benefits under the Hoechst Plan.
Id. at 1143. Plaintiffs sued Hoechst and its pension plans,
alleging that Hoechst’s failure to transfer sufficient assets to
American Mirrex to fund plaintiffs’ early retirement benefits
violated section 208. Id. They contended that notwithstanding
their insufficient age and years-of-service at the time they
transferred employment to American Mirrex they could qualify
for the early retirement benefits provided under the Hoechst
Plan through their subsequent service with American Mirrex,
and that Hoechst’s contrary interpretation of its plan amounted
to an amendment of the plan in violation of section 204(g). Id.
at 1144. Hoechst countered that it was not required to credit
service with American Mirrex and because plaintiffs could not
satisfy the conditions for receiving those benefits section 204(g)
did not protect them from cutback. Id. at 1144.
Finding scant guidance in the text of section 204(g), we
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turned to pertinent Internal Revenue Service Rulings to resolve
the case. Id. at 1144-45. Based on a Revenue Ruling that
concluded that under section 204(g) an employee could satisfy
following a plan termination the plan’s age and years-of-service
pretermination conditions for early retirement benefits and that
those benefits thus had to be funded before residual assets could
revert to the employer, we determined that had Hoechst
continued to employ the plaintiffs after terminating its plan the
plaintiffs still would have been able to qualify for the early
retirement benefits at some future date and Hoechst would have
had to have allowed the employees to “grow into” those
benefits. Id. at 1145-46. Relying on a further Revenue Ruling
that determined that a “separation from service” does not occur
upon an employee’s transfer to a successor employer, we
concluded that because the plaintiffs continued in the same job
for a successor employer, they could continue to accumulate
years of service under the Hoechst Plan through their subsequent
employment with American Mirrex and potentially satisfy the
age and years-of-service requirements for the early retirement
benefit. Id. at 1144-47. Accordingly, we held that section 208
required that Hoechst transfer sufficient assets to American
Mirrex to fund the early retirement benefits. Id. at 1147.
Gillis confirmed that satisfaction of benefit conditions
can occur after a plan termination or amendment. It is equally
clear from that case, however, that a plan participant
nevertheless must, at some point, meet all of the conditions
placed upon those benefits to receive them. Appellees contend
that the Magistrate Judge correctly found their claims viable
under Gillis notwithstanding the absence of any analysis of
appellees’ eligibility because under Gillis “transferred
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employees may treat service for a successor employer as service
for the plan sponsor for the purpose of qualifying for early
retirement benefits.” Appellees’ br. at 9. But this statement is
not correct for Gillis does not stand for the broad proposition
that service with a successor employer may be treated as service
for the plan sponsor to the end that all conditions the plan
sponsor places upon retirement benefits are obviated.
We concluded in Gillis that employees who continue in
the same job for a successor employer that has assumed the
assets and liabilities of the original employer’s plan may work
towards satisfying the age and years-of-service requirements of
the original employer’s plan while working for the successor
employer. 4 F.3d at 1147. But in Gillis, there was no bar to the
plaintiffs’ eligibility for the benefits under the Hoechst Plan
other than their inadequate age and years of service at the time
they ceased employment for Hoechst and plaintiffs could meet
those requirements with the progression of time. Here,
however, we do not have a plan spinoff, and age and years-ofservice requirements are not the impediments to appellees’ PJS
benefits eligibility under the Westinghouse Plan. Rather, the
“successor employer” provision of the Westinghouse Plan is an
explicit bar to eligibility that, quite aside from the sunset
provision in the Westinghouse Plan, forever disqualifies
appellees from receiving PJS benefits under that plan and is a
prohibition that the passage of time cannot cure.
Notwithstanding the timing of appellees’ “separation from
service,” appellees became ineligible for PJS benefits upon
being offered continued employment by Siemens. Stated
another way, appellees could not fulfill the conditions required
to obtain the PJS benefits as one of those conditions was that a
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successor employer not offer a plan participant continued
employment and that is precisely what happened here.
Accordingly, we are at a total loss as to how, as appellees urge
that we do, we can circumvent this explicit condition of the
Westinghouse Plan by somehow treating appellees’ service with
Siemens as uninterrupted service with Westinghouse and,
directly contrary to the terms of the Westinghouse Plan, ignore
appellees’ employment by Siemens. We decline to engage in
such judicial alchemy.
Though our result does not depend on this point, we note
also that upon termination by Siemens appellees faced the
additional bar to PJS eligibility that “solely” a termination by
Westinghouse, a Westinghouse subsidiary, or a joint venture
participating in the Westinghouse Plan allowed for PJS benefits
under the Westinghouse Plan. J.A. 292. Siemens is not a
Westinghouse subsidiary nor is it a joint venture participating in
the Westinghouse Plan.
Once before, in Gritzer v. CBS, Inc., 275 F.3d 291, 29394 (3d Cir. 2002), we considered whether termination by a
successor employer entitles former Westinghouse employees to
PJS benefits under the Westinghouse Plan. In that case, the
plaintiffs were former Westinghouse employees who had
transferred employment to Industrial Ceramics, Inc.,
(“Ceramics”) upon Westinghouse’s sale of a facility to
Ceramics. Id. at 293. Section 14(f)(1) of the relevant
Westinghouse Plan provided that the plan managers “may . . .
and to the extent they consider advisable, treat service with [a
successor company] as service with [Westinghouse] for
purposes of [vesting and eligibility for pensions and benefits].”
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Id. at 297. Pursuant to the sale, Ceramics and Westinghouse
also executed a Reciprocal Service Agreement (“RSA”)
providing that Westinghouse would grant to transferred
employees “service credit for their service with [Ceramics] for
the purposes of pension eligibility under any applicable
[Westinghouse] pension plan in which the employe[e]s may
have been participating, but not for purposes of pension benefit
accrual thereunder.” Id. at 293. Ceramics later closed the
facility, and the plaintiffs sued Westinghouse, by then, CBS for
PJS benefits. Id. at 294.
We observed that the Westinghouse Plan requires that the
“Employer” terminate an employee for purposes of PJS
eligibility and that “‘Employer’ means simply Westinghouse.”
Id. at 297. We concluded that, “any other successor company . .
. does not qualify as an ‘Employer’ under the express terms of
the Plan,” and that this fact was a “seemingly fatal flaw” in the
plaintiffs’ argument because a termination by Ceramics was
plainly not a qualifying termination under the PJS benefits
provision. Id. We then rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that
“Westinghouse, by extending some benefits under the Plan
through its RSA with Ceramics, automatically or necessarily by
virtue of [section] 14(F)(1) extended [PJS] benefits,” id. at 298,
and we thus held that the plaintiffs could not qualify for PJS
benefits, id. at 298-99.
As was true with respect to a successor employer to
Westinghouse in Gritzer, Siemens’ termination of appellees was
not a termination that triggered a possible claim for the PJS
benefits provision under the Westinghouse Plan. This fact
serves as an additional and independent bar to appellees’
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eligibility under the Westinghouse Plan apart from the successor
employer provision. It is important to recognize that appellees’
ineligibility for PJS benefits is not rooted in the sunset provision
of the Westinghouse Plan that we struck down in Bellas, and
that congruently the invalidation of the sunset provision cannot
possibly make the appellees eligible for PJS benefits from the
Westinghouse Plan or thus eligible for benefits under the
Siemens Plans. Rather, with or without the sunset provision,
there simply is no escape from the conclusion that appellees
could not satisfy the requisite conditions for receiving PJS
benefits under the Westinghouse Plan. Moreover, appellees do
not challenge the validity of these other requisite conditions.
Accordingly, because appellees could not satisfy at the
time of a hypothetical termination of the Westinghouse Plan nor
could they have satisfied at a later date the conditions for
receiving PJS benefits under the Westinghouse Plan, section
204(g) did not protect those benefits upon a hypothetical
termination of the Westinghouse Plan. Thus, appellees’ benefits
upon a hypothetical termination of the Westinghouse Plan just
prior to the transfer of liabilities would not have included PJS
benefits. Furthermore, upon a hypothetical termination of the
Siemens Plans just following the transfer of liabilities,
appellees’ benefits also would not have included PJS benefits.
Hence, appellees would have received no less upon a
hypothetical termination of the Siemens’ Plans following the
transfer of liabilities than they would have received upon a
hypothetical termination of the Westinghouse Plan just prior to
the transfer of liabilities. Consequently, Siemens’ omission of a
provision for PJS benefits and appellees’ consequent lack of
entitlement to PJS benefits upon a hypothetical termination of
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Siemens Plans just following the transfer of liabilities did not
diminish appellees’ benefits and neither section 208 nor section
204(g) required that Siemens provide appellees with PJS
benefits.
(b) The APA did not contractually require
Siemens to offer PJS benefits.
But the Magistrate Judge had more arrows in her quiver
than sections 208 and 204(g) because she found alternatively
that appellees were not required to meet the terms of the
Westinghouse Plan because “the APA extends the PJS benefits
by contractual agreement.” Shaver, 2007 WL 1006681, at *28.
In theory, such an agreement could have supported her
recommendation. Appellees understandably rely heavily on this
contractual theory as they contend that the APA provision
requiring Siemens to adopt a pension plan for the legacy
employees “that contains terms and conditions that are
substantially identical with respect to all substantive provisions
to those of the Westinghouse Pension Plan as in effect as of
[September 1, 1998],” J.A. 138, contractually bound Siemens to
provide PJS benefits to appellees apart from any specific ERISA
provision. At oral argument in support of this contention
appellees brought to our attention the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Evans v. Sterling Chemicals
Inc., 660 F.3d 862 (5th Cir. 2011).
But before considering Evans and the rest of the details
of appellees’ argument that the APA required Siemens to
provide for PJS benefits for legacy employees terminated after
August 31, 1998, it is useful to make an overview of the
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argument. When Siemens entered into the APA it knew of the
sunset, successor employer, and termination of employment by
Westinghouse 23 provisions of the Westinghouse Plan. Thus, if it
had contractually obligated itself to extend PJS benefits to the
legacy employees it would have been engaging in a rare, indeed
inexplicable act of corporate benevolence as it would have been
lifting three preexisting bars to the legacy employees advancing
PJS claims after that date. It is, of course, perfectly obvious that
Siemens had the exact opposite intent as it unmistakably
revealed by contracting for the closing date for the purpose of
pensions and benefits of the APA to be September 1, 1998. By
the use of that date Siemens ensured that it would not become
the employer for ERISA purposes until after the sunset
provision had eliminated the legacy employees’ potential claims
for PJS benefits. 24
Having completed our overview we now address Evans.
23

By referencing Westinghouse we are including its subsidiaries
and participating joint ventures in accordance with the
Westinghouse Plan.

24

Lest it be thought that we are ascribing to Siemens a
motivation that it did not have in adopting the September 1,
1998 closing date we refer to an internal Siemens memorandum
dated August 12, 1998, that indicated that among the advantages
of having Siemens “lease” Westinghouse employees until
August 31, 1998, Siemens “would not need to even include
Section 19 (PJS) in new pension plan, as it would have expired
before employees joined Siemens.” J.A. 477.
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In Evans, Cytec Industries, Inc., sold a portion of its business to
Sterling Fibers, Inc., and pursuant to that sale, a number of
Cytec employees continued employment with Sterling and
became participants in Sterling’s benefit plans. 25 Id. at 864-65.
Section 5.05(f) of the asset purchase agreement required
Sterling to provide postretirement medical and life insurance
benefits to employees who continued employment with Sterling
on a level at least equal to that of the Cytec Plan and required
that Sterling obtain the written consent of Cytec prior to
reducing benefits. Id. at 865. Sterling’s Plan, however, did not
include the relevant consent provision, and, in fact, provided
that Sterling could amend the plan at any time by action of the
plan committee. Id. Some years after the transaction, Sterling
entered bankruptcy, and during the course of those proceedings,
the bankruptcy court approved Sterling’s “rejection” of the
purchase agreement as an executory contract. Id. at 866. Soon
thereafter, Sterling raised the transferred employees’ benefit
premiums beyond the premiums that the Cytec Plan had set
without Cytec’s written consent. Id. at 866-67. The employees
sued Sterling, claiming that section 5.05(f) constituted a valid
amendment to the Sterling Plan but not an executory contract,
and thus it could not be rejected during the bankruptcy
proceedings. Id. at 868.
Relying on its holding in a similar case, Halliburton Co.
25

There were three related companies all including the name
“Cytec” and it is unclear which one or whether they all made the
sale to Sterling. The point, however, is not significant and as a
matter of convenience we refer to one of the companies, Cytec
Industries, as the vendor.
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Benefits Committee v. Graves, 463 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 2006), the
court of appeals determined that section 5.05(f) of the asset
purchase agreement constituted a valid amendment under
ERISA of Sterling’s benefit plan and that Sterling thus was
required to abide by the terms of that provision. 660 F.3d at
874. In this regard, the court concluded that although the asset
purchase agreement was extrinsic to the Sterling Plan and the
provision itself was not included within the plan, the agreement
constituted a valid plan amendment because the agreement was
in writing, contained a provision directed to an ERISA plan, and
the purchase agreement otherwise satisfied the formal procedure
required for a plan amendment under the Sterling Plan. Id. at
871-72.
Appellees’ reliance on Evans is misplaced. What
appellees fail to recognize is that even if we were to conclude
that the APA constituted a valid plan amendment of the Siemens
Plans (a remarkable conclusion as they were not so incidentally
non-extant as of the APA’s execution) or that the APA
otherwise defined Siemens’ ERISA obligations, there is no
provision within the APA requiring that Siemens provide PJS
benefits to appellees, and, as we have indicated, it has not done
so. Thus, Westinghouse and Siemens simply did not make an
agreement providing for the extension of PJS benefits to the
legacy employees.
In relevant part, paragraph 5.5(d)(iv) of the APA
provides that Siemens “shall be solely responsible for . . . any
benefits pursuant to Section 19 [the PJS provision] of the
[Westinghouse] Pension Plan and the corresponding provision
of the Siemens Pension Plan” with respect to legacy employees
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after September 1, 1998, J.A. 139-40, but we already have
concluded that appellees are not entitled to PJS benefits under
section 19 of the Westinghouse Pension Plan. Although
paragraph 5.5(d)(iv) may assume that Siemens would enact a
corresponding PJS benefits provision, it does not require
Siemens to do so and thus differs from the purchase agreement
provisions at issue in Evans and Halliburton. 26 Cf. Evans, 660
F.3d at 865 (“[Sterling] shall continue to provide postretirement
medical and life insurance benefits for such [qualifying]
Acquired Employee[s] that are no less favorable to such
Acquired Employee[s] than those benefits provided by [Cytec]
under the [Cytec benefit plans] . . . and [Sterling] shall not
26

Siemens argues that the APA contains language referencing a
corresponding PJS benefit provision in the Siemens Plans
because that language was drafted at a time when the parties
believed that the transaction would close before the effective
date of the sunset provision in the Westinghouse Plan. Under
that belief that ultimately proved to be mistaken with respect to
pensions and benefits, Siemens represents now that, to be in
conformity with the Westinghouse Plan, it did intend to provide
PJS benefits under its plans to the legacy employees from the
date of closing through August 31, 1998, and the portion of
paragraph 5.5(d)(iv) that implies that Siemens would provide
PJS benefits is a vestige of that belief. Thus, Siemens views the
language as contractually obsolete. While the long delay in
completing the PGBU transaction suggests that Siemens’
contention may be true, our conclusion regarding the import of
the APA does not mean that we are accepting Siemens’
representation for the reason of the mention of PJS benefits in
the APA.
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reduce the level of such benefits without the prior written
consent of [Cytec] . . . .”); Halliburton, 463 F.3d at 365
(“[Halliburton] shall . . . take all corporation action necessary to:
(i) maintain with respect to eligible participants . . . the
[acquired company’s] retiree medical plan, except to the extent
that any modifications thereto are consistent with changes in the
medical plans provided by [Halliburton] and its subsidiaries for
similarly situated active employees . . . .”).
Appellees’ invocation of paragraph 5.5(d)(i) is likewise
unavailing. That provision required that Siemens “establish a
defined benefit pension plan . . . that contains terms and
conditions that are substantially identical with respect to all
substantive provisions to those of the Westinghouse Pension
Plan as in effect as of [September 1, 1998].” J.A. 138 (emphasis
added). We already have noted that paragraph 5.5(a)(ii), which
requires Siemens to “provide compensation and benefit plans
and arrangements which in the aggregate are comparable . . . to
the compensation, Plans and Benefit Arrangements,” of the
Westinghouse Plan, id. 137 (emphasis added), supersedes
paragraph 5.5(d)(i) to the extent they set forth disparate
standards governing Siemens’ pension obligations. As we
observed previously, the amendment to the APA that changed
the closing date to September 1, 1998, for pension and benefit
purposes did not specifically include section 5.5(a), and the
closing date for purposes of section 5.5(a) thus technically
remained August 19, 1998. On that date, the Westinghouse Plan
included the sunset provision, which provided that “[i]n no
event shall a Permanent Job Separation occur after August 31,
1998.” Id. 293. Thus, even if we contorted section 5.5(a)’s “in
the aggregate comparable” standard to require adherence to all
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terms of the Westinghouse Plan, including the PJS benefits
provision, section 5.5(a) would have required that Siemens offer
PJS benefits to the legacy employees only through August 31,
1998. As the parties agree that Siemens did not terminate a
legacy employee prior to September 1, 1998, Siemens’ failure to
offer PJS benefits from August 19, 1998 to August 31, 1998, did
not deprive any legacy employee of benefits to which they were
entitled.
If we focus on paragraph 5.5(d)(i), as appellees urge, the
closing date of the APA for that paragraph was changed to
September 1, 1998. As of September 1, 1998, the Westinghouse
Plan still included the sunset provision. As complicated as this
case might be, on this point the English language meaning of the
Westinghouse Plan could not be clearer. Accordingly, even if
we were to conclude that the APA constituted an amendment of
the Siemens Plans or otherwise imposed upon Siemens pension
obligations independent of any specific ERISA provision
requiring that Siemens provide PJS benefits, paragraph 5.5(d)(i)
of the APA did not require Siemens to provide PJS benefits to
the legacy employees, because section 5.5(d) defines Siemens’
pension obligations in relation to the Westinghouse Pension
Plan as of September 1, 1998, and as of September 1, 1998, a
permanent job separation could not occur under the
Westinghouse Plan by virtue of the sunset provision. 27
27

On September 9, 1998, Westinghouse retroactively amended
its plan to provide, among other things, a new date by which PJS
benefits would be eliminated under the sunset provision. See
J.A. 107 (Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts). The September
9 amendment, which was retroactively effective as of August
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Appellees nonetheless urge that because we held in
Bellas that the sunset provision was an illegal cutback under
ERISA, Westinghouse’s liability for PJS benefits extending past
August 31, 1998 existed “as a matter of law” at the time of the
APA’s execution. Appellees’ br. at 13. They contend that the
sunset provision thus could not have limited Siemens’ promise
to provide substantially identical benefits. But as we have
explained the legacy employees are not entitled to PJS benefits
from Siemens without regard to the sunset provision and thus
the invalidation of the sunset provision is of no help to them. In
any event, we do not agree with appellees’ expansive view of
31, 1998, provided that “[i]n no event shall a Permanent Job
Separation occur after April 30, 2000.” J.A. 466 (Amendment
to the Westinghouse Plan). The parties agree that Siemens did
not participate in Westinghouse’s decision to enact this
amendment, see J.A. 107, and appellees do not contend that
Westinghouse’s independent amendment of its plan bound
Siemens. Nevertheless, we observe that although the September
9 amendment was retroactively effective to August 31, 1998,
and paragraph 5.5(d)(i) provided that Siemens would offer a
pension plan substantively identical to the Westinghouse Plan as
of September 1, 1998, Westinghouse’s unilateral retroactive
amendment to its plan more than a week after September 1,
1998, did not alter Siemens’ contractual undertaking in
paragraph 5.5(d)(i) of the APA. By the plain terms of the
Westinghouse Plan as they existed on September 1, 1998, the
date Siemens was required to reference under paragraph
5.5(d)(i), PJS benefits were no longer available under the
Westinghouse Plan by virtue of the original sunset provision,
which eliminated those benefits following August 31, 1998.
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the effect of Bellas on this point.
We recognize that nearly one year after the execution of
the APA, the District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania held that the sunset provision violated section
204(g), see Bellas v. CBS, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 500 (W.D. Pa.
1999), and one year later we affirmed that disposition, see
Bellas, 221 F.3d at 517. We grant that at the time of the APA’s
execution, Westinghouse was nonetheless legally obligated
under ERISA to allow for a permanent job separation to take
place following August 31, 1998, notwithstanding the
Westinghouse Plan’s plain language to the contrary which
neither we nor the district court yet had struck down. The terms
of the Westinghouse Plan, however, did not obligate
Westinghouse to provide PJS benefits after August 31, 1998,
and it is the terms of the Westinghouse Plan measured as of
September 1, 1998 — not Westinghouse’s underlying ERISA
obligations — that Siemens promised effectively to match in the
APA. See J.A. 138 (“substantially identical with respect to all
substantive provisions to those of the Westinghouse Pension
Plan as in effect of [September 1, 1998]”). Considering that
those terms had not yet been called into question by Bellas, we
find that our holding in that case cannot alter the plain language
of the APA.
Fundamentally, the APA is a contract. A basic principle
of contract construction is that we must interpret and enforce
unambiguous agreements according to their terms. See
McDowell v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 423 F.3d 233, 238 (3d
Cir. 2005); Morais v. Central Beverage Corp. Union Emps.’
Supplemental Retirement Plan, 167 F.3d 709, 712 (1st Cir.
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1999) (“[C]ontracts containing unambiguous language must be
construed according to their plain and natural meaning[.]”)
(quoting Smart v. Gillette Co. Long-Term Disability Plan, 70
F.3d 173, 178 (1st Cir. 1995)). 28 In no uncertain terms, Siemens
agreed to provide benefits “substantially identical to” those
provided under the Westinghouse Plan as of September 1, 1998,
and the Westinghouse Plan did not provide PJS benefits for
employees terminated after August 31, 1998, even putting aside
the fact that it did not ever require Westinghouse to pay benefits
to employees terminated by a successor employer. Our later
invalidation of the sunset provision as to Westinghouse could
not change the parameters of Siemens’ contractual undertaking
either with respect to the termination date of the separations for
PJS eligibility or with respect to the entity terminating the
employment, i.e., a Westinghouse employer. Nor, of course,
could it change the Westinghouse Plan’s provision that there
would not be a permanent job separation of an employee offered
continued employment by a successor employer.
In short, there are three separate reasons why appellees
are not entitled to PJS benefits from Siemens: (1) the sunset
28

Because the APA is a contract that “potentially affects rights
protected by [ERISA] . . . [it] is likely subject to interpretation in
accordance with tenets of federal common law.” Smart, 70 F.3d
at 178 (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56,
107 S.Ct. 1549, 1557 (1987)); cf. Morais, 167 F.3d at 711 (“[I]t
is well settled that federal common law applies both to interpret
the provisions of an ERISA benefit plan and to resolve ‘[i]ssues
of relinquishment of rights and waiver’ when such side
agreements affect the benefits provided by an ERISA plan.”).
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provision cut-off date of August 31, 1998; (2) the provision that
the terminating employer had to be a Westinghouse affiliate; and
(3) the provision that there would not be a permanent job
separation if a successor employer offered employment to a
terminated employee. If somehow in a way beyond our
conception the APA could be deemed to have been modified by
our invalidation of the sunset provision in Bellas, the remaining
two bars nevertheless would remain in place to the end that
appellees could not obtain PJS benefits from Siemens. Thus, as
complicated as this case seems to be in the end the result that we
must reach is quite clear.

VI. SUMMARY
In summary, we hold that appellees are not entitled to
PJS benefits from Siemens. First, we conclude that Siemens did
not adopt the Westinghouse Pension Plan as an ERISA
“transition” plan from August 19 to August 31, 1998, and thus
did not violate section 204(g) when it adopted the Siemens
Plans, which lacked PJS benefits. Second, we conclude that
because appellees had not satisfied the conditions for PJS
benefits upon a hypothetical termination just prior to
Westinghouse’s transfer of liabilities to Siemens and could not
satisfy in the future the conditions for those benefits, sections
204(g) and 208 did not protect those benefits from cutback and
appellees’ benefits would not have included PJS benefits upon
Westinghouse Plan’s hypothetical termination. Consequently,
Siemens’ omission of PJS benefits from its Plans and appellees’
resulting lack of entitlement to PJS benefits under Siemens
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Plans upon a hypothetical termination basis just following the
transfer of liabilities did not diminish appellees’ benefits in
violation of section 208. Finally, we conclude that Siemens did
not obligate itself in the APA to provide PJS benefits to the
legacy employees. Finding no ERISA provision that requires
otherwise, we must enforce the Siemens Plans as written, and
beyond any reasonable dispute those Plans do not entitle
appellees to PJS benefits.
VII. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District
Court’s March 30, 2007 order to the extent that it denied
Siemens’ summary judgment and granted appellees summary
judgment. Because we conclude that none of the appellees are
entitled to PJS benefits from Siemens, we need not reach the
questions certified for interlocutory appeal regarding the validity
of the Release Plaintiffs’ waivers as they did not have any PJS
benefits to waive and we thus dismiss the certified interlocutory
appeals. We likewise need not address appellees’ related
contention that the District Court erred in denying appellees’
claim that they were entitled to retiree medical and life insurance
benefits that they contended must accompany PJS benefits as
there are no PJS benefits to accompany and we will dismiss the
appeal relating to that issue. In sum, Siemens is entitled to
summary judgment as to both the Release and the Non-Release
Plaintiffs, i.e., all appellees, and we therefore will remand the
case to the District Court to enter summary judgment for
Siemens and for the Siemens Plans. The entry of that order will
terminate this litigation on the substantive matters in issue.
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